Stumping the Mobile Chipset

Adam Donenfeld & Yaniv Mordekhay

Check Point
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES LTD.

Agenda

- **Chipsets and security**
- **Kernel vulnerabilities and exploitation**
  - **ASHmenian Devil**
  - **Qualaroot**
  - **Syncockaroot**
  - **Kangaroot**
- **Disclosure process**
- **Conclusions**

~ $ cat AUTHORS|xargs -n 1 man

Adam Donenfeld

- Years of experience in research
- Vulnerability assessment
- Vulnerability exploitation
- In meiner Freizeit, lerne ich Deutsch gern ☺

Yaniv Mordekhay

- Veteran developer and researcher
- Specialization in behavioral analysis
- Specialization in statistical analysis
- Avid hiker

Special thanks to Avi Bashan, Daniel Brodie and Pavel Berengoltz for helping with the research

Android Architecture

Qualcomm Chipsets

The dangers of chipset vulnerabilities



* ABI Research, February 2016

Qualcomm's chipset subsystems



Welcome to Qualand



ASHmenian Devil (ashmem vulnerability)

CVE-2016-5340

- Ashmem – Android's propriety memory allocation subsystem
- Qualcomm devices uses a modified version
  - Simplifies access to *ashmem* by Qualcomm modules

```
int get_ashmem_file(int fd,
 struct file **filp,
  struct file **vm_file,
     unsigned long *len)
{
     int ret = -1;
     struct ashmem_area *asma;
     struct file *file = fget(fd);
     if (is_ashmem_file(file)) {
          asma = file->private_data;
          *filp = file;
          *vm_file = asma->file;
          *len = asma->size;
          ret = 0;
     } else {
          fput(file);
     }
     return ret;
}
```

Is our fd an ashmem file descriptor?

ASHmenian Devil (ashmem vulnerability)

CVE-2016-5340

- Obtain a file struct from file descriptor
- Compare file operation handlers to expected handler struct
  - If it matches → file type is valid

```
static int is_ashmem_file(struct file *file)
{
	char fname[256], *name;
	name = dentry_path(file->f_dentry, fname, 256);
	return strcmp(name, "/ashmem") ? 0 : 1; /* Oh my god */
}
```

ASHmenian Devil (ashmem vulnerability)

CVE-2016-5340

- Exploitation requires –
  - Creation of file named “ashmem” on root mount point (“/”)
- / is read-only ☹

ASHmenian Devil - POC

CVE-2016-5340

- Opaque Binary Blob
  - APK Expansion File
  - Support APKs > 100MB
  - Deprecated (still works!)
- A mountable file system

ASHmenian Devil - POC

CVE-2016-5340

- Create an OBB
- Create “ashmem” in it’s root directory
- Mount the OBB
- Map “ashmem” memory to the GPU
  - Pass a fd to the fake ashmem file


GPU
Performance
Thermal
IPC
Router
Ashmem

Qualaroot (IPC Router vulnerability)

CVE-2016-2059

- Qualcomm's IPC router
- Special socket family
  - *AF_MSM_IPC* (27)
- Unique features
  - Whitelist specific endpoints
  - Everyone gets an "address" for communication
  - Creation/destruction can be monitored by anyone
- Requires no permission ☺

Qualaroot (IPC Router vulnerability)

CVE-2016-2059

- *AF_MSM_IPC* socket types
  - *CLIENT_PORT*
  - *CONTROL_PORT*
  - *IRSC_PORT*
  - *SERVER_PORT*

- Each new socket is a *CLIENT_PORT* socket

```
static int msm_ipc_router_ioctl(
     struct socket *sock,
     unsigned int cmd,
     unsigned long arg)
{
     struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
     struct msm_ipc_port *port_ptr;

     lock_sock(sk);
     port_ptr = msm_ipc_sk_port(sock->sk);
     switch (cmd) {
     ....
     case IPC_ROUTER_IOCTL_BIND_CONTROL_PORT:
          msm_ipc_router_bind_control_port(
          port_ptr)
     ....
     }
     release_sock(sk);
     ....
}
```

```
int msm_ipc_router_bind_control_port(
struct msm_ipc_port  *port_ptr)
{
     if (!port_ptr)
          return -EINVAL;

     down_write(&local_ports_lock_lhc2);

     list_del(&port_ptr->list);

     up_write(&local_ports_lock_lhc2);

     down_write(&control_ports_lock_lha5);

     list_add_tail(&port_ptr->list, &control_ports);

     up_write(&control_ports_lock_lha5);
     return 0;
}
```

Client list



```
down_write(&local_ports_lock_lhc2);
list_del(&port_ptr->list);
up_write(&local_ports_lock_lhc2);
down_write(&control_ports_lock_lha5);
list_add_tail(&port_ptr->list, &control_ports);
up_write(&control_ports_lock_lha5);
```

Control list

Client list

```
down_write(&local_ports_lock_lhc2);
list_del(&port_ptr->list);
up_write(&local_ports_lock_lhc2);
down_write(&control_ports_lock_lha5);
list_add_tail(&port_ptr->list, &control_ports);
up_write(&control_ports_lock_lha5);
```

Control list

Qualaroot (IPC Router vulnerability)

CVE-2016-2059

- *control_ports* list is modified without a lock
- Deleting 2 objects from *control_ports* simultaneously!

Qualaroot (implementation)





LIST_POISON

```
static inline void list_del(
      struct list_head * entry)
{
      next = entry->next;
      prev = entry->prev
      next->prev = prev;
      prev->next = next;
      entry->next = LIST_POISON1;
      entry->prev = LIST_POISON2;
}
```

Qualaroot (implementation)



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}
```

entry = A

next = B

prev = control_ports

B->prev = control_ports

Qualaroot (implementation)



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B->prev = control_ports


CONTEXT SWITCH
HD
TORY.COM
imgflip.com

Qualaroot (implementation)



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}
```

entry = B

next = C

prev = control_ports

C->prev = control_ports

Qualaroot (implementation)



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

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}
```

entry = B

next = C

prev = control_ports

control_ports->next = C

Qualaroot (implementation)



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entry = B

next = C

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control_ports->next = C

Qualaroot (implementation)



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}
```

entry = B

next = C

prev = control_ports

B->prev = B->next = POISON

Qualaroot (implementation)




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B->prev = B->next = POISON


CONTEXT SWITCH
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Qualaroot (implementation)




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      entry->next = LIST_POISON1;
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}
```

entry = A

next = B

prev = control_ports

control_ports->next = B

Qualaroot (implementation)




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prev = control_ports

control_ports->next = B

Qualaroot (implementation)




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entry = A

next = B

prev = control_ports

A->prev = A->next = POISON

Qualaroot (implementation)




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      entry->prev = LIST_POISON2;
}
```

entry = A

next = B

prev = control_ports

A->prev = A->next = POISON

Qualaroot - Implementation

- Two following objects are deleted
  - Simultaneously!
- control_ports points to a FREE data
  - LIST_POISON worked – No longer mappable
  - Spraying af_unix_dgram works
- Iterations on control_ports?
  - Just close a client_port!
  - Notification to all control_ports with *post_pkt_to_port*

```c
static int post_pkt_to_port(struct msm_ipc_port *UAF_OBJECT,
                            struct rr_packet *pkt, int clone)
{
        struct rr_packet *temp_pkt = pkt;
        void (*notify)(unsigned event, void *oob_data,
                       size_t oob_data_len, void *priv);
        void (*data_ready)(struct sock *sk, int bytes) = NULL;
        struct sock *sk;

        mutex_lock(&UAF_OBJECT->port_rx_q_lock_lhc3);
        __pm_stay_awake(UAF_OBJECT->port_rx_ws);
        list_add_tail(&temp_pkt->list, &UAF_OBJECT->port_rx_q);
        wake_up(&UAF_OBJECT->port_rx_wait_q);
        notify = UAF_OBJECT->notify;
        sk = (struct sock *)UAF_OBJECT->endpoint;
        if (sk) {
                read_lock(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
                data_ready = sk->sk_data_ready;
                read_unlock(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
        }
        mutex_unlock(&UAF_OBJECT->port_rx_q_lock_lhc3);
        if (notify)
                notify(pkt->hdr.type, NULL, 0, UAF_OBJECT->priv);
        else if (sk && data_ready)
                data_ready(sk, pkt->hdr.size);

        return 0;
}
```

Qualaroot - Implementation

- *wake_up* function
  - Macros to *__wake_up_common*

```
static void __wake_up_common(
        wait_queue_head_t *q
        .......)
{
        wait_queue_t *curr, *next;

        list_for_each_entry_safe(curr, next,
         &q->task_list, task_list) {
                ...
                if (curr->func(curr, mode,
                 wake_flags, key))
                        break;
        }
}
```

Qualaroot - Implementation

- *wake_up* function
  - Macros to *__wake_up_common*
- New primitive!
  - A call to function with first controllable param
- *Not good enough for commit_creds*

Qualaroot - Implmenetation

- Upgrade primitives
- Find a function that can call an arbitrary function with address-controlled parameters



Qualaroot - Implementation

- *usb_read_done_work_fn* receives a function pointer and a function argument

```
static void usb_read_done_work_fn(
        struct work_struct *work)
{
        struct diag_request *req = NULL;
        struct diag_usb_info *ch = container_of(
                work, struct diag_usb_info,
                read_done_work);
        ...
        req = ch->read_ptr;
        ...
        ch->ops->read_done(req->buf,
                req->actual,
                ch->ctxt);
}
```

Qualaroot - Implementation

- Chaining function calls –

  __wake_up_common → usb_read_done_work_fn → any function

```
static void __wake_up_common(
        wait_queue_head_t *q
        .......)
{
        wait_queue_t *curr, *next;

        list_for_each_entry_safe(curr, next,
         &q->task_list, task_list) {
                ...
                if (curr->func(curr, mode,
                 wake_flags, key))
                        break;
        }
}
```

Qualaroot - Implementation



Qualaroot – Exploitation Flow

Create UAF situation using the vulnerability

Qualaroot – Exploitation Flow



Spray unix_dgrams to catch the UAF

Qualaroot – Exploitation Flow



Spray until list_iterator is at the UAF

Trigger list_iterator to catch the UAF

Qualaroot – Exploitation Flow




PERMISSIVE=1,UID=0
NOT BAD
imgflip.com

Demo Time!


GPU
Performance
Thermal
IPC
Router
Ashmem

IDR mechanism

- ID to pointer translation service
- Handle to kernel objects from user mode without using pointers

IDR mechanism



Syncockaroot (syncsource vulnerability)

CVE-2016-2503

- SyncSource objects
  - Used to synchronize activity between the GPU and the application
- Can be created using IOCTLs to the GPU
  - IOCTL_KGSL_SYNCSOURCE_CREATE
  - IOCTL_KGSL_SYNCSOURCE_DESTROY
- Referenced with the IDR mechanism

```
long kgsl_ioctl_syncsource_destroy(
        struct kgsl_device_private *dev_priv,
        unsigned int cmd, void *data)
{
        struct kgsl_syncsource_destroy *param = data;
        struct kgsl_syncsource *syncsource = NULL;

        syncsource = kgsl_syncsource_get(
                dev_priv->process_priv,
                 param->id);
        if (!syncsource)
                goto done;
        /* put reference from syncsource creation */
        kgsl_syncsource_put(syncsource);
        /* put reference from getting the syncsource above */
        kgsl_syncsource_put(syncsource);
done:
        return 0;
```

1

2

1

0

```
long kgsl_ioctl_syncsource_destroy(
        struct kgsl_device_private *dev_priv,
        unsigned int cmd, void *data)
{
        struct kgsl_syncsource_destroy *param = data;
        struct kgsl_syncsource *syncsource = NULL;

        syncsource = kgsl_syncsource_get(
                dev_priv->process_priv,
                 param->id);
        if (!syncsource)
                goto done;
        /* put reference from syncsource creation */
        kgsl_syncsource_put(syncsource);
        /* put reference from getting the syncsource above */
        kgsl_syncsource_put(syncsource);
done:
        return 0;
```

Any “pending free” check here?

Syncockaroot (syncsource vulnerability)

CVE-2016-2503

free, sprayable data

REFCOUNT == -1

Thread A

```
syncsource = kgsl_syncsource_get(id);
…
…
kgsl_syncsource_put(syncsource);
…
…
kgsl_syncsource_put(syncsource);
```

Thread B

```
syncsource = kgsl_syncsource_get(id);
…
…
kgsl_syncsource_put(syncsource);
…
…
kgsl_syncsource_put(syncsource);
```

Syncockaroot – PoC

CVE-2016-2503

- Create a syncsource object
  - A predictable IDR number is allocated
- Create 2 threads constantly destroying the same IDR number
- Ref-count will be reduced to -1
  - Right after getting to zero, object can be sprayed

Use After Free ☺


GPU
Performance
Thermal
IPC
Router
Ashmem

KanGaroot (KGsl vulnerability)

CVE-2016-2504

- GPU main module (kgsl-3d0)
- Map user memory to the GPU
  - IOCTL_KGSL_MAP_USER_MEM
  - IOCTL_KGSL_GPUMEM_FREE_ID
- Referenced by a predictable ID
  - IDR mechanism

```
long kgsl_ioctl_gpumem_free_id(
        struct kgsl_device_private *dev_priv,
        unsigned int cmd, void *data)
{
        struct kgsl_gpumem_free_id *param = data;
        struct kgsl_mem_entry *entry = NULL;

        entry = kgsl_sharedmem_find_id(private,
                param->id);

        if (!entry) {
                return -EINVAL;
        }

        return _sharedmem_free_entry(entry);
}
```

```
static long _sharedmem_free_entry(
        struct kgsl_mem_entry *entry)
{
        bool should_free = atomic_compare_exchange(
                entry->pending_free,
                 0, /* if pending_free == 0 */
                 1); /* then set pending_free = 1 */

        kgsl_mem_entry_put(entry);
        if(should_free)
                kgsl_mem_entry_put(entry);

        return 0;
}
```

LOCKED APPROPRIATELY



```
static int
kgsl_mem_entry_attach_process(
     struct kgsl_mem_entry *entry,
     struct kgsl_device_private *dev_priv)
{
     id = idr_alloc(&process->mem_idr,
      entry, 1, 0, GFP_NOWAIT);

     ...
     ret = kgsl_mem_entry_track_gpuaddr
          (process, entry);
     ...

     ret = kgsl_mmu_map(pagetable,
      &entry->memdesc);
     if (ret)
          kgsl_mem_entry_detach_process(entry);
     return ret;
}
```

LOCKED INAPPROPRIATELY

KanGaroot (KGsl vulnerability)

CVE-2016-2504

6

IDR items

Thread A - allocator

```
entry = kgsl_mem_entry_create();
…
…
id = idr_alloc(…, entry, …);
…
…
initialize_entry(entry);
```

Thread B - releaser

```
entry = kgsl_sharedmem_find_id(id);
…
…
if(!entry)
     return -EINVAL;
…
…
 sharedmem_safe_free_entry(entry);
```

KanGaroot (KGsl vulnerability)

CVE-2016-2504

free, sprayable data

IDR items

Thread A - allocator

```
entry = kgsl_mem_entry_create();
…
…
id = idr_alloc(…, entry, …);
…
…
initialize_entry(entry);
```

Thread B - releaser

```
entry = kgsl_sharedmem_find_id(id);
…
…
if(!entry)
     return -EINVAL;
…
…
 sharedmem_safe_free_entry(entry);
```

KanGaroot - POC

CVE-2016-2504

- Map memory
- Save the IDR
  - Always get the first free IDR – predictable
- Another thread frees the IDR
  - Before the first thread returns from the IOCTL

UAF in kgsl_mem_entry_attach_process on 'entry' parameter

Disclosure

Syncockaroot (CVE-2016-2503)

4th April, 2016

Vulnerability disclosure to Qualcomm

2nd May, 2016

Qualcomm confirmed the vulnerability

6th July, 2016

Qualcomm released a public patch

6th July

Google deployed the patch to their Android devices

Disclosure

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

1st August, 2016

Google deployed the patch to their Android devices

Disclosure

ASHmenian Devil (CVE-2016-5340)

10th April, 2016

Vulnerability disclosure to Qualcomm

02nd May, 2016

Qualcomm confirmed the vulnerability

28th July, 2016

Qualcomm released a public patch

TBD

Google deployed the patch to their Android devices

OUT OF BAND PATCH BY SEVERAL OEMS

Disclosure

Qualaroot (CVE-2016-2059)

2nd February, 2016

Vulnerability disclosure to Qualcomm

10th February, 2016

Qualcomm confirmed the vulnerability

29th April, 2016

Qualcomm released a public patch



TBD

Google deployed the patch to their Android devices



Suggestions/Special Thanks

commit_creds for always being there for me

Absense of kASLR,
for not breaking me and commit_creds apart

SELinux, for being liberal,
letting anyone access mechanisms like Qualcomm’s IPC

Am I Vulnerable?



Google Play

QuadRooter Scanner

Yaniv Mordekhay
yanivmo@checkpoint.com

Adam Donenfeld
doadam@gmail.com

Thank You!

Check Point
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES LTD.