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Man-made super-flu could kill half humanity
- Thread starter quest7
- Start date
This is taken from the end of the same article quest quoted:
That's why it's far from a clear cut decision.
Bob Maxey
Android Expert
Sometimes we need to create the occasional unimaginable horror to find out how to protect us from others that create unimaginable horrors to do us in. We must, unfortunately, create these biological materials so we can study them.
Not saying this is good, but it might be required. There are many possible scenarios and you will go nuts thinking about the crap that awaits us. I am of the opinion that this country will eventually see a biological attack. In fact, I think we will be forced into a corner at some point and it will be WW3. Lets hope we know what we are doing.
US asks scientific journals to censor bird flu studies-
The US government has asked the scientific journals Nature and Science to censor data on a laboratory-made version of bird flu that could spread more easily to humans, fearing it could be used as a potential weapon.
The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity asked the two journals to publish redacted versions of studies by two research groups that created forms of the H5N1 avian flu that could easily jump between ferrets - typically considered a sign the virus could spread quickly among humans.
The journals are objecting to the request, saying it would restrict access to information that might advance the cause of public health.
m.guardian.co.uk
The US government has asked the scientific journals Nature and Science to censor data on a laboratory-made version of bird flu that could spread more easily to humans, fearing it could be used as a potential weapon.
The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity asked the two journals to publish redacted versions of studies by two research groups that created forms of the H5N1 avian flu that could easily jump between ferrets - typically considered a sign the virus could spread quickly among humans.
The journals are objecting to the request, saying it would restrict access to information that might advance the cause of public health.
m.guardian.co.uk
Controversial Killer Flu Research Paused | Wired Science | Wired.com
Researchers developing extra-contagious strains of H5N1 avian influenza have agreed to pause their work for 60 days.
The moratorium, announced Jan. 20 in Nature and Science, is a response to public fear and alarm in the scientific community, which has split over whether the research could inadvertently lead to release of a nightmare disease.
Critics, including many high-profile virologists, epidemiologists and biosecurity experts, said it was possible that would-be biological terrorists could use the research to develop weaponized flu strains. Another, perhaps more frightening possibility was unintentional release: dozens of accidental infections (.pdf) have occurred at high-security laboratories in the United States, and it’s thought that one now-global flu strain may actually have escaped from a Russian laboratory in the 1970s. Against these risks, the benefits were arguable, and some virologists even said that mutations engineered in a laboratory didn’t necessarily illuminate future dangers.
“The research should never have been undertaken because the potential harm is so catastrophic and the potential benefits from studying the virus so speculative,” opined the New York Times in a Jan. 8 editorial entitled “An Engineered Doomsday.”
Contrary to the researchers’ insistence that the work was “using the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity,” it was conducted at so-called Biosafety Level 3 — a set of techniques and safeguards less strict than is used for Ebola and the Marburg virus, which pose less potential threat than an H5N1 strain that easily infects people.
Researchers developing extra-contagious strains of H5N1 avian influenza have agreed to pause their work for 60 days.
The moratorium, announced Jan. 20 in Nature and Science, is a response to public fear and alarm in the scientific community, which has split over whether the research could inadvertently lead to release of a nightmare disease.
Critics, including many high-profile virologists, epidemiologists and biosecurity experts, said it was possible that would-be biological terrorists could use the research to develop weaponized flu strains. Another, perhaps more frightening possibility was unintentional release: dozens of accidental infections (.pdf) have occurred at high-security laboratories in the United States, and it’s thought that one now-global flu strain may actually have escaped from a Russian laboratory in the 1970s. Against these risks, the benefits were arguable, and some virologists even said that mutations engineered in a laboratory didn’t necessarily illuminate future dangers.
“The research should never have been undertaken because the potential harm is so catastrophic and the potential benefits from studying the virus so speculative,” opined the New York Times in a Jan. 8 editorial entitled “An Engineered Doomsday.”
Contrary to the researchers’ insistence that the work was “using the highest international standards of biosafety and biosecurity,” it was conducted at so-called Biosafety Level 3 — a set of techniques and safeguards less strict than is used for Ebola and the Marburg virus, which pose less potential threat than an H5N1 strain that easily infects people.
ChadKaplowski
Member
whilst I can understand the arguementsw that producing a super strain of H5N1 will enable us to identify an antidote to it, I am skeptical - generally because the very nature of the influenza virus is tohat it does mutate regularly, this is how the human body is susceptible to seasonal flu every year - the marginal mutations within it mean that the human body doesn't have the correct antibodies to prevent it taking hold each time.
So the questions from me really are two fold.
Given the influenza's ability to mutate itself anyway, is this research containing a massive 5 mutations not kind of pointless because it only looks at one, rather far reaching outcome, as opposed to a myriad of possible mutations?
Secondly, if you are producing this research in order to understand how to defeat any potential world killer virus, would it not be sensible and even ethical to publish nothing until you had engineered both the deadly virus, but also a 100% effective cure for it? Annoluncing simply the creation of teh virus with no reference to a working cure feels rather evil scientist to me.
So the questions from me really are two fold.
Given the influenza's ability to mutate itself anyway, is this research containing a massive 5 mutations not kind of pointless because it only looks at one, rather far reaching outcome, as opposed to a myriad of possible mutations?
Secondly, if you are producing this research in order to understand how to defeat any potential world killer virus, would it not be sensible and even ethical to publish nothing until you had engineered both the deadly virus, but also a 100% effective cure for it? Annoluncing simply the creation of teh virus with no reference to a working cure feels rather evil scientist to me.
argedion
The TechnoFrog
Them giving us this information does not really bother me much. Don't get me wrong I don't think that this kind of stuff should be available to anyone however my issue is this. How many other virus's are being made that we have no clue about or how many scientist are working on projects like this and already have a "High Bidder" to sell the formula to? Ever since our creation we have looked for a way to destroy us. What a bunch of Selfish Suicidal Bastards we are. 