Any substance behind this claim? Your repetition of "faulty" here only emphasizes a deficit in rationale behind the claim. You merely evade to the next claim:
You are also contradicting yourself with more faulty logic in your rationalization below where you trivialize the transfer of the relationship of IMEI number with the owner because you don't know anyone who has purchased a used handset.
Again, you claim "faulty logic", but fail to call out a logical fallacy. "Trivializing" something is not a logical fallacy. I made more than one supporting statement in regards to what you're attempting to counter, and the best you've come up with is (at best) a lack of knowing people who buy used handsets. This is a
cherry picking fallacy. Your claim also coupled with a red herring fallacy. It would not matter if you could effectively convince everyone here that
used phones are more popular than I'm claiming, this does not obviate the relationship of IMEI number with the owner. The relationship is maintained regardless of whether the device changed hands.
You here hypothesize that because something is technically possible, that people are in fact doing it it significant numbers.
More broken logic. This is a straw man fallacy. I was disputing the absurd claim that
no one is doing this. Technically, I would only need to support the idea that
just one person is doing it, and that alone would be sufficient for my position that you're replying to.
Showing that there significant numbers of hackers and also significant numbers of stalkers is not to claim that there are significant numbers of the particular hacker-stalker that I'm talking about.
Even if there were actual instances beyond proof of concept experiments, it would not be random data collection but targeted surveillance.
Who's to say that targeted surveillance cannot make use of "random" pre-collected data? Any data collected for whatever purpose can later be used for another purpose, obviously.
Poor set theory. You are assuming that B is the primary key. As you know the primary key in any table must be unique. So if A were your phone number, B your IMEI and C was your name, B would only be relevant to A or C, not A AND C. The primary key is always independent of data and only links the rows.
Several flaws here. I said nothing about a primary key here. The link between the data need not be based on a primary key. "B" could even be something as loose as a GPS fix, because there is not necessarily any constraint on having irrefutable linkage. IOW, depending on the data being analyzed, inaccuracies may even be acceptable if their proportionately small with respect to the size of the dataset. Moreover, you've changed my premise to vary the conclusion. Of course if you unlink B to either A or C, you will lose the linkage from A to C -- this avoid my premise and conclusion -- and in fact it's consistent with it.
The problem lies not with the knowledge of your SSN (or IMEI) but in the practice of banks accepting the SSN as proof of identity. If the banks performed due diligence with identity checks it would eliminate many of the problems but increase the cost of doing business.
This is false dichotomy logic. You're correct about the usage of SSNs being a problem, but this does not mean knowledge of SSN ceases to be a problem. It's in fact a composition of circumstances that's a problem. If the banks did not have the SSN to begin with, the problem you point out could not have emerged.
When it comes to mitigating problems, users more readily have control over what data disclosed than how it will be used after disclosure. When users lose control over disclosure, it's a significant problem because it allows for the problem of misuse.
I fail to see how your VIN number in any way mitigates crime.
This is another cherry picking fallacy. I'll address it anyway. The VIN mitigates crime just as any security feature mitigates crime: by raising the bar. Criminals go for the low-hanging fruit. You make them go through more hoops (like making it more difficult to evade detection), and you've countered the most opportunistic among the set of purpetrators. Consider a fake CCD installation. Some opportunistic criminals will see the mock cam, and decide that because there's a detection mechanism, even though they
could get around it, they just can't be bothered to stack on more risk. So they move on. Sure, some criminals will work around it.. they will scrub the VIN, and export the engine overseas, but the control is still effective against some criminals.
The mobile networks need the IMEI to manage
Perhaps. I'm not necessarily disputing that.
and so does Google. Since you can have multiple devices registered to the same Google account and the IMEI is a readily available unique identifier for the device, it makes perfect sense to use it.
Nonsense. Google does not need the IMEI to provide the services I'm using. I access google services from countless many
unregistered devices on a regular basis -- devices that don't even have an IMEI, or anything that is actually being supplied in leiu of an IMEI for that matter. Google does not need to uniquely identify a
device when they have a unique IP and port to send the packets to, in response to a unique cookie that was generated for that session.